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For over a decade, the boom in research, development, and application of distributed 
sensor networks (DSNs) has enabled their pervasion in many aspects of human life. In 
such networks, collaboration among sensor nodes plays a key role in resolving 
distributed tasks. Typically, traditional cryptographic protections such as encryption and 
authentication are utilised to secure this collaboration against malicious attacks. 
 
Unfortunately, this secured collaboration is undermined by an attack named Controlled 
Link Establishment Attack (CLEA). To launch CLEA, the attacker first captures and 
compromises a limited number of nodes to extract their secret information. Next, the 
attacker repetitively utilises the compromised nodes and secret information to create 
overwhelming controlled links with legitimate nodes. These controlled links are then 
used to subvert network-wide cooperative efforts or gain the control of the network. 
 
This thesis comprises two parts: CLEA investigation and development of new 
countermeasures against CLEA. The investigation involves (i) identifying and 
characterising CLEA based on the examination of actual instances (ii) undertaking a 
literature review of existing key establishment schemes for DSNs and pinpointing their 
vulnerability to CLEA (iii) performing a comprehensive survey of existing 
countermeasures applicable to defend against CLEA, and (iv) studying the feasibility of 
CLEA. The conclusion drawn from this investigation is that although CLEA is a real 
and serious threat, no sufficiently robust and efficient countermeasures have been found 
in the literature to defeat the attack. 
 
Abstract 
The development starts with a study of related works that can be used as building blocks 
for new countermeasures followed by their description. The proposed countermeasures 
can be classified into either protection-based approach or detection-based approach. 
Following the first approach, three schemes focusing on protecting key establishment 
schemes by leveraging a cryptographic one-way hash chain are developed. Following 
the second approach, three schemes are introduced. The first two schemes are capable 
Abstract 
 v 
of detecting and stamping out CLEA attempts from the beginning. The final scheme is 
even more powerful than the previous ones with the ability to identify and revoke the 
source of the attack. 
 
Finally, thorough evaluations of the proposed schemes in respect of security features 
and performance overheads are carried out through intensive analyses, simulations, 
implementation, and extensive comparison with other schemes. The findings from these 
evaluations indicate that the proposed schemes achieve robust and effective prevention, 
detection, and revocation capability against CLEA with reasonable overheads. In 
comparison, the protection-based schemes are more performance efficient but less 
security effective than the detection-based schemes. They are all suitable for use in the 
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